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AVOIDING THE THICKETS OF
GUESSWORK: THE DELAWARE SUPREME
COURT AND CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF
CORPORATION LAW
The Honorable Henry duPont Ridgely, Justice,
Supreme Court of Delaware*
I. INTRODUCTIONIT is indeed a pleasure for me to return to the SMU Corporate Coun-
sel Symposium. I always enjoy returning to Texas. My nine-year-old
granddaughter does as well, though she is not with me on this trip.
My granddaughter also loves to read. She is a voracious reader and has
already finished all seven J.K. Rowling Harry Potter books. More than
four hundred million copies of J.K. Rowling's books have been sold in
over two hundred countries.' One of J.K. Rowling's Harry Potter novels
includes a quotation that reminds me of the challenges judges and regula-
tors face in determining novel issues of another state's law when that
state's highest court has not yet addressed the issue.
In Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, Professor Albus Dum-
bledore, the Headmaster of Hogwarts, explains to Harry, "From this
point forth, we shall be leaving the firm foundation of fact and journeying
together through the murky marshes of memory into thickets of wildest
guesswork." 2 Guesswork, of course, is a risky way to proceed in the real
world. But educated guesswork is what judges and regulators must do in
predicting how another state would decide a novel issue of state law.
Today, I will speak about how to avoid those thickets of guesswork on
issues of corporation law through the mechanism of certifying questions.
Counsel in corporate cases can educate judges and regulators on the ad-
vantages to all parties of using the certified question of law process when
circumstances permit it.
* I wish to acknowledge and express my appreciation to my judicial law clerk,
Michael Stephen Darby, for his research assistance for these remarks.
This essay was adapted from the Keynote Address given by Justice Ridgely at the 18th
Annual SMU Corporate Counsel Symposium in Dallas, Texas, on October 1, 2010. The
text is largely unchanged and preserves the informal language of Justice Ridgely's speech.
1. Guy Dammann, Harry Potter Breaks 400m in Sales, THE GUARDIAN (June 18,
2008, 12:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/jun/18/harrypotter.news.
2. J.K. RoWLING, HARRY POTrER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 197 (2005).
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I intend to cover this afternoon the history of certifying questions of
law, including its roots in England and the U.S. Supreme Court's en-
dorsement fifty years ago, the Uniform Law Commission's success in
promulgating the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Dela-
ware's certified question process, examples of missed opportunities to
certify that lead to excess uncertainty, delay and expense, and conclude
with success stories in the use of this process by federal courts, the SEC,
and my own Court. In each success-story instance, the choice was made
not to journey through murky marshes of memory into thickets of guess-
work but to get a timely answer from the ultimate authority on the state
law involved. Of course, I need to disclaim from the outset that to the
extent that I express any opinions today, they are my own and not formal
expressions of the Delaware Supreme Court.
II. HISTORY
The certified question of law has a richer history than one might sus-
pect. The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859 provided for certifica-
tion of questions of law within the British Empire.3 In its preamble, the
drafters of that Act stated its purpose as follows: "[G]reat Improvement
in the Administration of the Law would ensue if Facilities were afforded
for more certainly ascertaining the Law administered in one Part of Her
Majesty's Dominions when pleaded in the Courts of another Part
thereof."4 Two year later, the Foreign Law Ascertainment Act of 1861
provided for certification of questions to foreign states.5
In the United States, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins6 was the primary catalyst for the development of the process of
the certification of questions of law.7 Because the U.S. Supreme Court in
Erie required federal courts to follow state law in non-federal matters,
post-Erie federal courts have been placed in the unenviable position of
ascertaining state law, even where the question presented is an issue of
first impression.8 That unenviable experience is shared by state courts as
well. 9
The first effort to solve this thorny problem began in Florida. In 1960,
Justice Frankfurter spoke highly of a Florida statute that provided for
certification: "The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with
the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved
in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to certify
such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for
3. See British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 63, § 1 (Eng.).
4. Id. c. 63, preamble.
5. See Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 11, § 1 (Eng.).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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its decision."10 Fourteen years later, in Lehman Brothers v. Schein, the
U.S. Supreme Court again endorsed the certification of questions of
law."
Some members of the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against perceived
dangers. In his dissenting opinion in Clay v. Sun Insurance, Justice Doug-
las explained: "I desire to give renewed protest to our practice of making
litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain justice.... Some
litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two." 1 2 Justice Rehnquist had a somewhat different view. In his
concurring opinion in Lehman Brothers v. Schein, he explained: "State
certification procedures are a very desirable means by which a federal
court may ascertain an undecided point of state law . . . [b]ut . . . the use
of such a procedure is more a question of the considerable discretion of
the federal court."13 Justice Rehnquist continued: "[W]hile the certifica-
tion procedure is more likely to produce the correct determination of
state law, additional time and money are required to achieve such a
determination." 1 4
III. UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT
As the certification process began to gain popularity in the United
States, the desire arose for uniformity. In 1967, the Uniform Law Com-
mission promulgated the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act.'5 The Commission has supplied amended versions of the Uniform
Act in 1990 and 1995.16 Today, forty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia have adopted a certification process, in one form or another.' 7 At
a minimum, each of these states allows for certification from the U.S.
Supreme Court or from a federal appeals court.18 New Jersey and North
Carolina have yet to amend their law to provide for certification to their
highest courts.' 9
Notwithstanding this progress, the Uniform Law Commission has ex-
pressed concerns that the process is not used "as frequently as it could
and should be". 20 I agree. Despite the Uniform Act, many states have
10. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (emphasis added).
11. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
12. Clay, 363 U.S. at 227-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 394.
14. Id. at 395.
15. Uniform Law Commission, Summary, Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
[Act] [Rule] (1995), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-summaries/
uniformacts-s-ucoqolar95.asp.
16. Id.
17. 17A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &
VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4248 n.30
(3d ed. 2007).
18. See id. § 4248.
19. See id. § 4248 n.30.




adopted slightly modified versions of it.21 The Uniform Law Commis-
sion, as well as a leading commentator on the subject, cite the lack of
uniformity as the primary cause of this underutilization. 22
It should be noted that the Uniform Act only allows a state's highest
court or one of its intermediate appellate courts to certify a question to
another state's highest court. 23 In fact, in its commentary, the Uniform
Law Commission expressed concern about extending the power to inter-
mediate appellate courts.24 It stated that its apprehension was somewhat
alleviated because "[tihe receiving court has the discretion to accept or
reject a certified question and can use this power to avoid being burdened
by an excessive number of certified questions." 25 The fact is many states
do not allow for certification from trial-level courts-state or federal. 26
Delaware does.27 While there are important considerations involved,
such as fear of overburdening state courts of last resort, I see an advan-
tage, based upon my own experience, to allow all trial courts to certify
novel questions of law.2 8
For example, when I was the president judge of Delaware's Superior
Court, I was faced with a novel question of Missouri law that was ex-
tremely important to the outcome of an environmental insurance cover-
age case where eight hundred million in claims were at issue.29 I was
required to determine the meaning of certain pollution exclusion clauses
under Missouri law. 3 0 The exclusions included an exception, which rein-
stated coverage if the polluting activity was "sudden and accidental."31
Courts across the country were divided on the meaning of this phrase. In
my opinion, I explained that "[b]ecause the Missouri courts ha[d] not re-
solved the issue, [my] task [was] to discern how the Missouri Supreme
Court would rule if presented with the issue."32 I relied on a variety of
sources, including an Eighth Circuit opinion and Webster's Third New
International Dictionary.33 But it was no easy task. I was tempted to
consider what the late President Harry S Truman, the only president born
in Missouri, would have considered the language to plainly mean. What
would Harry say? I was in the thicket of educated guesswork.
21. Id.
22. See id. & n.3 (citing Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127, 183 (1992)).
23. See id. § 2.
24. See id. § 2 cmt.
25. Id.
26. See WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & AMAR, supra note 17, § 4248.
27. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); DEL. SuP. CT. R. 41(a)(ii).
28. Alternatively, if a state supreme court is not empowered to accept certified ques-
tions from a trial court, that trial court may attempt to certify the question to its supreme
court with a request to have the question certified to the other state supreme court.
29. Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-118, 1993 WL 563253 (Del.
Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 1993).
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *7.
33. Id. at *7-8.
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When federal courts enter this thicket, they have looked to a variety of
sources for making a prediction. For example, the Third Circuit recently
explained its approach as follows:
([In the absence of any clear precedent of the state's highest court,
we must predict how that court would resolve the issue.) ("In mak-
ing such a prediction, we ... consider relevant state precedents, anal-
ogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other
reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in
the state would resolve the issue at hand." Furthermore, in the ab-
sence of direct authority from the [state's] [s]upreme [c]ourt, we may
treat as persuasive authority decisions of the [intermediate appellate
courts of the state]. ("[A]n intermediate appellate state court is a
datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a
federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the
highest court of the state would decide otherwise.") 34
These protocols raise the question-why not just ask the state supreme
court? In Delaware, you can.
IV. DELAWARE HISTORY
In 1983, Delaware amended its Constitution to provide for the certifi-
cation of questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court.35 Article IV,
Section 11(8) of the Delaware Constitution provides: The Supreme Court
shall have jurisdiction
[t]o hear and determine questions of law certified to it by other Del-
aware courts, the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of
Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court . . . or
the highest appellate court of any other state, where it appears to the
Supreme Court that there are important and urgent reasons for an
immediate determination of such questions by it.36
In 2007, section 11(8) was amended to provide the Delaware Supreme
Court with jurisdiction over questions certified to it by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission.37
Section 11(8) further provides that "[t]he Supreme Court may, by
rules, define generally the conditions under which questions may be certi-
fied to it and prescribe methods of certification."3 8 In 1984, the Court
amended the Supreme Court Rules to provide the process by which ques-
tions may be certified. 39 In Delaware Supreme Court Rule 41(b), we pro-
vide examples of reasons to accept certification, including when "[t]he
34. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) (cita-
tions omitted) (quoting respectively Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 220-21 (3d
Cir. 2008); Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2007); West v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
35. 64 Del. Laws 446 (1983).
36. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
37. 76 Del. Laws 34 (2007).




question of law is of first instance" in Delaware,4 0 when "[t]he decisions
of the trial courts are conflicting upon the question of law," 4 1 or when
"[tlhe question of law relates to the constitutionality, construction or ap-
plication of a statute of [Delaware] which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Court." 4 2
Since the amendment of Delaware's Constitution, the Delaware Su-
preme Court has accepted and answered numerous certified questions.
We have accepted questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond,4 3 Third,4 4 Seventh,4 5 Eleventh, 46 and District of Columbia 4 7 Cir-
cuits. We also have accepted twelve questions from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware, 48 two questions from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York,49 and one question each
from the U.S. District Courts for the Southern District of Florida5 0 and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.51 Finally, we have accepted one
question from the Securities and Exchange Commission. 52
Although we are empowered to accept certified questions from Dela-
ware trial courts, I prefer to review a case filed in Delaware with the full
benefit of our lower courts' reasoning. In matters of corporation law, for
example, the experience and wisdom of Delaware trial judges, who regu-
larly determine and apply Delaware law, add to the analysis. Moreover,
there is the absolute right of the parties in Delaware to file a direct ap-
peal upon entry of a final judgment in the case. On the other hand, when
courts from foreign forums certify questions to us, they may have less
familiarity with the nuances of Delaware corporation law, and we other-
wise may not have the opportunity to review the issue. Therefore, it is
more likely for us to accept certified questions from a foreign forum.
40. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 41(b)(i).
41. DEL. SuP. CT. R. 41(b)(ii).
42. DEL. SuP. CT. R. 41(b)(iii).
43. See Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464 (Del. 1995).
44. See, e.g., Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363 (Del. 1998); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146 (Del. 1997); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 690 A.2d 936
(Del. 1996).
45. See Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996).
46. See Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019 (Del. 2001).
47. See Farahpour v. DCX, Inc., 635 A.2d 894 (Del. 1994).
48. See Waters v. United States, 787 A.2d 71 (Del. 2001); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Burr, 706
A.2d 499 (Del. 1998); Potter v. Peirce, 688 A.2d 894 (Del. 1997); United States v. Ander-
son, 669 A.2d 73 (Del. 1995); United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098 (Del. 1994);
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993); Wallace v. Archambo, 619 A.2d 911 (Del.
1992); Miller v. Spicer, 602 A.2d 65 (Del. 1991); Richardson v. Town of Ocean View, 535
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1988); Fiat Motors of N. Am. v. Mayor of Wilmington, 498 A.2d 1062 (Del.
1985); Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entm't Establishments, 577 A.2d 754 (Del. 1990)
(refusing to answer); Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989) (re-
fusing to answer).
49. See Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010); A.W. Fin. Servs. v. Empire Res.,
Inc., 981 A.2d 1114 (Del. 2009).
50. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Fla. Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457 (Del.
1999).
51. Hoesch v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 677 A.2d 29 (Del. 1996).
52. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
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The ability of other forums to certify questions of Delaware corpora-
tion law to the Delaware Supreme Court is indispensable for one specific
reason: the internal affairs doctrine. 53 As Justice White explained in Ed-
gar v. MITE Corp.,
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which rec-
ognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a
corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors,
and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced
with conflicting demands. 54
Even though Delaware is the home of 63% of Fortune 500 companies,
55% of the U.S. firms on the New York Stock Exchange and the NAS-
DAQ, and 80% of the U.S. IPOs since 2003,55 actions concerning the in-
ternal affairs of those corporations are not always litigated in the
Delaware courts. When other courts are confronted with these cases, the
internal affairs doctrine requires them to apply Delaware law.5 6 There-
fore, if another jurisdiction is faced with a significant and unanswered
question of Delaware corporation law, it makes sense for counsel to sug-
gest consideration of a certification of the question to the Delaware Su-
preme Court. Otherwise, it is a missed opportunity.
V. MISSING OPPORTUNITIES IN DELAWARE
Let me give you some examples of missed opportunities I have noted.
Litigation based upon the case of Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Pathe Commu-
nications is illustrative.57 In that case, Chancellor Allen addressed the
role of the board when a corporation was in the "vicinity of insolvency."58
In footnote fifty-five of Credit Lyonnais, Chancellor Allen described the
".community of interests that [a] corporation represents."5 9 In discussing
"hypothetical" directors who believe they owe duties to groups other
than shareholders, Chancellor Allen commented:
Such directors will recognize that in managing the business affairs of
a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may
arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow
for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockhold-
ers (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested
in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.60
Courts, lawyers, and executives in other jurisdictions struggled in un-
derstanding the significance of the Chancellor's dicta and speculated
53. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
54. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 302 cmt. b (1971)).
55. E-mail from Richard J. Geisenberger, Chief Deputy Sec'y of State, State of Del.,
to author (Sept. 24, 2010, 14:19 EST) (on file with author).
56. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645.
57. 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099 (Del. Ch. 1991).
58. Id. at 1155.




whether, under Delaware law, directors of corporations that were in the
zone of insolvency owed a duty to creditors. For example, in 2004, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York cited Chancel-
lor Allen's footnote fifty-five as authoritative Delaware law. 6 1 Relying
on Credit Lyonnais, the district judge concluded that a corporation, which
was in the zone of insolvency, owed fiduciary duties to its creditors. 62 In
that case, it turned out that he was wrong.
Two years later, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas reached a different conclusion. 63 In Floyd v. Hefner, in 2006, the
district judge held that "Chancellor Allen's opinion did not even purport
to create a cause of action that would allow creditors to sue the directors
of a corporation. It merely exonerated directors who chose to maintain a
corporation's long-term viability." 64 It turned out that she was right.
Approximately sixteen years after Chancellor Allen's opinion in Credit
Lyonnais, the Delaware Supreme Court was finally provided the opportu-
nity to settle the debate. In North American Catholic Educational Pro-
gramming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla,65 the Court explained that
[w]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency,
the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must
continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best inter-
ests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.66
Similar to the "zone of insolvency" claim, we also have addressed the
viability of the so-called "deepening insolvency" claim. The 2003 case of
In re Exide Technologies67 is illustrative. There, the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware relied on a Third Circuit decision that inter-
preted Pennsylvania law, as well as "the Delaware courts' policy of pro-
viding a remedy for an injury," to predict that the "Delaware Supreme
Court would recognize a claim for deepening insolvency." 68
Fortunately, just three years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery had
the opportunity to correct this misstatement of Delaware corporate law.
Vice Chancellor Strine, in Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst &
61. Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
62. Id. at 215-16.
63. Floyd v. Hefner, No. H-03-5693, 2006 WL 2844245, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2006).
64. Id.
65. 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
66. Id. at 101.
67. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide
Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
68. Id. at 752. The bankruptcy court likely could have certified a question to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. Although article IV, section 11(8) of the Delaware Constitution
does not specifically empower the Delaware Supreme Court to accept certified questions
from bankruptcy courts, at least one state supreme court has interpreted a grant of power
to accept certified questions from a federal district court to include the power to accept
questions from the bankruptcy court of that district. See In re Shepard Co., 342 A.2d 918,
921-22 (R.I. 1975).
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Young,69 explained that "[t]he concept of deepening insolvency has been
discussed at length in federal jurisprudence, perhaps because the term has
the kind of stentorious academic ring that tends to dull the mind to the
concept's ultimate emptiness."70 In concluding that Delaware law does
not recognize a "deepening insolvency" claim, the Vice Chancellor re-
marked, "[T]he fact of insolvency does not render the concept of 'deep-
ening insolvency' a more logical one than the concept of 'shallowing
profitability.'"71
Had a federal or state court taken advantage of the process of the certi-
fication of questions of law that the Delaware Constitution provides, the
Delaware Supreme Court may have resolved, at a much earlier date, the
question raised by Chancellor Allen's Credit LyonnaiS72 footnote as well
as the viability of a "deepening insolvency" claim. Why does that matter?
Missed opportunities have several consequences. First, they frustrate
courts and litigants, as they try to "guess" what conclusions another
state's highest court would reach in the case. Second, these missed op-
portunities create uncertainty in the business community, as directors and
officers attempt to fulfill their duties as fiduciaries of a corporation and to
properly structure transactions. Third, depending upon the determina-
tion of the local court, parties may be wrongfully required to incur the
expense of litigation, settlement, or even personal judgments against
them. If courts used the certification process in appropriate circum-
stances, these unfortunate consequences could be avoided or, at least,
correctly resolved at an earlier time.
VI. SUCCESS STORIES
But there are success stories. Three examples of the advantageous use
of the certification process come to mind. My first example involves the
Securities and Exchange Commission's certification of two questions of
law to the Delaware Supreme Court in the 2008 case of CA, Inc. v.
AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.7 3 AFSCME, a CA stockholder, pro-
posed a bylaw for inclusion in CA's 2008 proxy materials. 74 The pro-
posed bylaw required CA's board of directors to cause the corporation to
reimburse stockholders for reasonable expenses incurred in nominating
candidates in contested director elections.75 CA notified the SEC's Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance (the Division) of its intention to exclude the
bylaw from the proxy materials and requested a "no-action letter."76 CA
69. 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), affd sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett,
931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 205.
72. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 17 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1099, 1155 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
73. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
74. Id. at 229.
75. Id. at 229-30.
76. Id. at 230.
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and AFSCME each obtained legal opinions from Delaware law firms and
submitted them to the Division." Because these legal opinions of Dela-
ware law were conflicting, the SEC, at the request of the Division, certi-
fied the following two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court: first,
whether the proposed bylaw was a proper subject for action by share-
holders as a matter of Delaware law; and, second, whether the bylaw, if
adopted, would cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it was
subject.78
To answer the first question, we relied on provisions of the Delaware
General Corporation Law. Specifically, we looked to section 109(a),
which provides that
the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stock-
holders . . . ; provided, however, any corporation may, in its certifi-
cate .. . confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the
directors.... The fact that such power has been so conferred upon
the directors . . . shall not divest the stockholders . . . of the power,
nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.79
Despite the theoretical vesting of concurrent power in both the board and
the shareholders, we concluded that "Section 109(a) does not exist in a
vacuum"80 and that it must be read with Section 141(a), which provides
that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . .. shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors."81 Although we deter-
mined that "the shareholders' statutory power to adopt, amend or repeal
bylaws is not coextensive with the board's concurrent power and is lim-
ited by the board's management prerogatives under Section 141(a)," 82 we
also recognized that there is some "shareholder action that Section
109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors' power
to manage [the] corporation's business and affairs under Section
141(a)." 83 We held that "purely procedural bylaws do not improperly en-
croach upon the board's managerial authority under Section 141(a)," 84
including AFSCME's proposed bylaw. In concluding our analysis of the
first certified question, we stated: "The shareholders of a Delaware cor-
poration have the right to participate in selecting the contestants for elec-
tion to the board."85
In analyzing the SEC's second certified question-whether the bylaw,
if adopted, would cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it was
subject-we relied on Delaware's robust body of caselaw to conclude
that, under certain circumstances, AFSCME's proposed bylaw could
77. Id.
78. Id. at 230-31.
79. Id. at 231 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a)).
80. Id. at 231-32.
81. Id. at 232 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)).
82. Id. at 232.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Id. at 235.
85. Id. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cause CA directors to breach their fiduciary duties. 86 Specifically, we
looked to the 1994 case of Paramount v. QVC87 and the 1998 case of
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro.88 In those cases, the Court
invalidated binding contractual arrangements that the board of directors
had voluntarily imposed on themselves because those contracts limited
the extent to which the directors could exercise their fiduciary duties.89
We properly characterized AFSCME's proposed bylaw as a "binding
bylaw that the shareholders [sought] to impose involuntarily on the direc-
tors in the specific area of election expense reimbursement." 90 As a re-
sult, the bylaw as written could "prevent the directors from exercising
their full managerial power in circumstances where their fiduciary duties
would otherwise require them to deny reimbursement to a dissident
slate," and, thus, it would violate Delaware law.91
Our opinion in AFSCME provided courts and the SEC with important
guidance. First, it reaffirmed the bedrock principle in Delaware that the
directors manage the business and affairs of a corporation. And second,
the opinion confirmed that shareholder bylaws on process are permitted,
but they may not interfere with the board's ability to fulfill its fiduciary
duties. The speed with which the Court answered the question is also
worth noting: we accepted the SEC's questions on July 1, heard oral argu-
ment on July 9, and issued an opinion on July 17.92
My second example involves the most recent case in which the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has accepted a certified question of law. Just this
past summer, in Lambrecht v. O'Neal,93 we accepted a certified question
from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
There, plaintiffs filed derivative actions on behalf of Merrill Lynch to re-
cover losses of $3.6 billion Merrill allegedly suffered in transactions that
occurred before Bank of America acquired Merrill. 94 When Merrill be-
came a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of America, the plaintiffs'
shares were converted to Bank of America shares, and the district court
dismissed the actions because the plaintiffs were no longer Merrill share-
holders and, thus, lacked standing to assert derivative claims on Merrill's
behalf. 95
The plaintiffs then brought the actions as "double derivative actions,"
whereby they sought to force the Bank of America board, as Merrill's
parent, to compel the Merrill board to bring the actions.96 The defend-
86. See id. at 238.
87. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
88. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
89. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d at 238-39 & nn. 26-30 (citing Quickturn
Design Sys., Inc., 721 A.2d 1281, and QVC, 637 A.2d 34).
90. See id. at 239.
91. Id. at 239-40.
92. See id. at 227, 231.
93. 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010).
94. Id. at 279.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 279-80.
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ants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that, to sue double de-
rivatively, the plaintiffs were required to show that they were and
continued to be Bank of America shareholders both at the time of Mer-
rill's alleged wrongdoing and after the merger.97 The defendants further
argued that Bank of America was a shareholder of Merrill at the time of
Merrill's alleged misconduct. 98 Under the defendants' model, a double
derivative action was two lawsuits in one; first, a derivative action by the
stockholder of the parent and a second derivative action of the parent as
a stockholder of the subsidiary.
After hearing oral argument and considering the defendants' novel
ground for granting the motion to dismiss, the district court appropriately
certified the following question to the Delaware Supreme Court:
Whether plaintiffs in a double derivative action under Delaware law,
who were pre-merger shareholders in the acquired company and
who are current shareholders, by virtue of a stock-for-stock merger,
in the post-merger parent company, must also demonstrate that, at
the time of the alleged wrongdoing at the acquired company, (a)
they owned stock in the acquiring company, and (b) the acquiring
company owned stock in the acquired company.99
The defendants contended that this was the proper model to provide
standing in a double derivative suit. We concluded that the defendants'
model was incorrect and, therefore, answered the certified question in the
negative.1oo
In reaching that conclusion, we identified several conceptual flaws in
the defendants' model. First, we noted that such a model effectively
would preclude any plaintiff from bringing a double derivative suit "ex-
cept in bizarrely happenstance circumstances."101 We explained that
"our precedents not only validate but also encourage the bringing of
double derivative actions in cases where standing to maintain a standard
derivative action is extinguished as a result of an intervening merger." 102
Second, we explained that the defendants' proposed requirement that
Bank of America own Merrill stock at the time of the alleged wrongful
conduct was unsupported by Delaware law.103 As the parent of Merrill,
Bank of America did not need to proceed derivatively; rather, Bank of
America could enforce the claim by the direct exercise of its complete
control over Merrill as its parent.104 Third, we explained that the defend-
ants' proposed requirement that the plaintiffs own Bank of America
stock at the time of Merrill's alleged misconduct was also incorrect. 05
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 280.
100. Id. at 287, 293.




105. Id. at 289.
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Just as Bank of America, itself, did not need to own Merrill stock at the
time of the alleged misconduct, the plaintiffs were not required to own
Bank of America stock at that time; rather, the plaintiffs were required to
own Bank of America stock only at the time they sought to bring the
action. 106 Fourth, we rejected the defendants' contention that their
model represented the correct policy under Delaware law-defendants
argued that their model respected the corporate separateness of Bank of
America and Merrill and barred what the defendants termed, a "de facto
continuation of the pre-merger original derivative action." 07 Rather
than a de facto continuation, we concluded that the double derivative
action was a "new, distinct action in which standing to sue .. . rest[ed] on
a different temporal and factual basis-namely, the failure of the BofA
board, post-merger, to enforce the premerger claim of its wholly-owned
subsidiary."10 8 Under this structure, "the policies favoring both the pres-
ervation of the corporate separateness of the parent and subsidiary and
the prevention of abusive derivative suits are fully respected."1 09 We also
rejected the defendants' reliance on the 2004 court of chancery opinion in
the case of Saito v. McCall.110 In doing so, "[w]e conclude[dj that, insofar
as Saito addresse[d] the issue presented here, [Saito] [did] not represent
sound Delaware law."111
In Lambrecht, just as in AFSCME, we answered difficult and important
questions of Delaware corporate law without delay. These were not easy
issues to resolve, and a foreign court could have reached completely dif-
ferent conclusions. Other courts, boards, and shareholders may have re-
lied on those determinations for years, just as occurred with the
misinterpretation of Credit Lyonnais. Given these dismal consequences,
the value of the certified question process is apparent.
My last example for you today illustrates the important point that, al-
though the Delaware Supreme Court often accepts certified questions of
law, the Court, itself, will not hesitate, in appropriate circumstances, to
certify questions of law to another state's highest court. The road of the
certified question is indeed a two-way street.
In March of this year, we certified a question to the New York Court of
Appeals in the case of Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Price-
waterhouseCoopers.112 There, the Delaware Court of Chancery dis-
missed shareholder derivative claims against PricewaterhouseCoopers.113
The court of chancery held that the alleged misconduct of AIG's senior
officers was imputed to AIG, and once imputed, AIG's claims against
106. Id.
107. See id. 289-90 (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. at 290.
109. Id.
110. Id. (rejecting a holding of Saito v. McCall, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 650 (Del. Ch.
2004)).
111. Id.
112. 998 A.2d 280, 280 (Del. 2010) (certified question answered by Kirschner v. KPMG




PricewaterhouseCoopers for failure to perform its auditing responsibili-
ties in accordance with professional standards were barred as a matter of
New York law under its in pari delicto doctrine. 114 An appeal to the Del-
aware Supreme Court followed. We concluded that "a resolution of [the]
appeal depends on significant and unsettled questions of New York law
that are properly answered, in the first instance, by the New York Court
of Appeals.""15 Accordingly, we certified the following question to that
court:
Would the doctrine of in pari delicto bar a derivative claim under
New York law where a corporation sues its outside auditor for pro-
fessional malpractice or negligence based on the auditor's failure to
detect fraud committed by the corporation; and, the outside auditor
did not knowingly participate in the corporation's fraud, but instead,
failed to satisfy professional standards in its audits of the corpora-
tion's financial statements? 16
The case has been argued before the New York Court of Appeals, so we
will soon know the answer without educated guesswork on our part.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even Justice Douglas, who initially criticized the mechanism in Clay,
eventually recognized the virtues of certifying questions of law. Fourteen
years after calling the process "a long, expensive road in order to obtain
justice,"' 17 Douglas, in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,xi8 succinctly described its
utility: "We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and
where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory. It
does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps
build a cooperative judicial federalism."1 19 Today, his words still ring
true.
To conclude, the certification of questions of law enjoys a rich history.
It has grown in popularity as more and more states adopt procedures by
which their state supreme courts can answer certified questions. This
leads to more efficient and accurate determinations of state law. With a
more predictable and certain body of law, parties can construct their rela-
tions more efficiently, with less uncertainty, and at reduced cost. Rather
than journey to the "thickets of guesswork," there is a better way.
114. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 817-30 (Del. Ch. 2009).
115. See Teachers' Ret. Sys., 998 A.2d at 280.
116. Id. at 282-83.
117. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
119. Id. at 390-91.
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